PhD Candidate, Philosophy, University of Toronto
matt.delhey@mail.utoronto.ca
I am a Ph.D. Candidate in the Philosophy Department at the University of Toronto. My dissertation, Hegel's Theory of Institutions, is supervised by Rebecca Comay.
My research lies at the intersection of 19th-Century Philosophy (especially Hegel and German idealism) and Social and Political Philosophy.
I am also interested in German idealism's contribution to new currents in social philosophy, such as social ontology, critical social theory, and the philosophy of technology. Political economy, institutional and recognitive theory, and the changing relationship between labor and technology are of special interest in these fields. My engagement with these issues is informed by my background as a statistician and experience working as a data scientist in the technology sector.
Historically, my work centers on Hobbes, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Marx, including their influence on social theory and the Frankfurt School.
My CV can be found here.
Abstract: This article reevaluates Hölderlin's social and political thought in the 1790s. Against Georg Lukács, it argues that Hölderlin's politics of the new mythology, while utopian, are not mystical. In the Fragment of Philosophical Letters and the Oldest System-Programme of German Idealism, Hölderlin instead articulates two fundamental claims. Socially, the new mythical collectivity must elevate (erheben) the social relations produced by bourgeois society, exalting them in aesthetic-religious form, rather than sublating (aufheben) them, modifying both their form and their content. Politically, realizing this new collectivity requires transcending the state, and so is essentially revolutionary. Hölderlin's prosaic writings thus supplement Hyperion's romantic critique of modernity. They take as their point of departure a sober exposition of the social relations of the market emerging in Hölderlin's time and, from within these relations, excavate a new mythical collectivity capable of suturing the fragmentary divisions of modern life.
Abstract: Hegel's commentators often attribute to his system some form of apriorism, the view that the system's content or its justification (or both) are independent of experience and empirical science. In this article, I argue that apriorism conflicts with Hegel's commitment to cooperation between the philosophical and empirical sciences, as outlined in §§1–18 of the 1830 Encyclopaedia. I do so by attributing two theses to Hegel: scientific cooperation—that knowledge arises through a process of conceptual transformation which requires an intellectual division of labour between the philosophical and empirical sciences; and incompatibility—that scientific cooperation entails a feedback loop between the philosophical and empirical sciences, rendering the concepts of Hegel's system empirically revisable, and so not a priori. Although these two theses hold across all the philosophical sciences, I focus on their application in logic, as it is in logic where apriorist interpretations appear the most justified. Reimagining a scientifically cooperative Hegel not only supports naturalist readings of his system but also reframes the task of philosophical critique. Critique, on the scientific-cooperative reading I propose, aims to exposit the insights, discoveries, and theories of the empirical sciences, furthering their ends by ameliorating their conceptual apparatus, not to debunk them.
Abstract: Hegel's interpreters often regard his turn toward an institutional analysis of society and politics to be among his most important contributions to philosophy. However, precisely how to understand this institutional turn in Hegel's thought and its success as a paradigm for social philosophy remain a matter of ongoing scholarly debate. In this paper, I aim to further our understanding of Hegel's institutionalization of ethical life by reconstructing just one aspect of his institutional theory, namely, its account of institutional content as rational or vernünftig, insofar as it responds to Fichte's account of institutional content being the product of arbitrariness or Willkür.
My pedagogy centers on the practice of writing, which I support with regular, low-stakes writing assignments, scaffolded assignments, in-class writing exercises, and metacognitive reflections on writing practice. For more information, see the sample syllabi below.
International Hobbes Association, Eastern APA, New York, NY (1/2024)
International Hegel-Vereinigung, "The Self-Conception of Philosophy and its Relationship to the (Other) Sciences," Stuttgart, Germany (6/2023)
Association of Philosophy Students, University of Toronto, Scarborough (10/2022)
Association of Philosophy Students, University of Toronto, Scarborough (3/2022)
A collection of links that I have found helpful for thinking and writing about Hegel.
An event series I co-organized with colleagues in Cinema Studies, Comparative Literature, and Philosophy funded by the Jackman Humanities Institute's Program in the Arts. The series ran for two discontinuous years: Collectivity, Performance, Dialectics (2020–21) and The Labour of the Negative (2022–23).
A reading group started during the COVID-19 pandemic. We've read, inter alia, the Grundrisse, Volume 1, and Volume 2. From contemporary authors, we've read Black Marxism (Cedric Robinson), The Warehouse (Alessandro Delfanti), and Marx and Critical Theory (Emmanuel Renault), the latter two having joined the reading group for discussion of their work. We're currently reading Volume 3.